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Market Reaction to Actual 
Daily Share Repurchases in Greece 
 
Abstract 
The stock market reaction around the announcement date of actual share repurchases, the factors 
that affect the size of that reaction, and the motives behind share acquisitions are examined. A 
unique, hand-collected dataset is used, including public announcements of companies traded on 
the Athens Stock Exchange. Consistent with the price support hypothesis, companies repurchase 
when their share price exhibits a declining trend, whereas the short-term market reaction is not 
statistically significant. Large firms and firms with low book-to-market ratio repurchase when 
their stock has underperformed the market. Small firms and firms with high book-to-market ratio 
repurchase even though their shares have not experienced abnormal declines. The market reacts 
more favorably to buybacks by small firms and firms with high book-to-market ratio. Long-term 
abnormal returns are higher for repurchasing firms compared to non-repurchasing controls, and 
depend positively on the frequency of repurchases and the stated reason for program 
authorization.  
 
JEL Classification: G14, G15, G35 
Keywords: Actual share repurchases, market reaction, firm characteristics, stated repurchase 
reasons, price support hypothesis 
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1. Introduction 
Several published studies examine the motives of firms behind open-market share repurchase 
programs (SRPs), especially in the USA. The most popular hypothesis is that SRPs are used by 
companies to send a signal to the market indicating that their stock is underpriced. A partial 
literature includes Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981), Bartov (1991), Dann et al. (1991), Comment 
and Jarrell (1991), and Lie and McConnell (1998).1 Company executives consider stock 
underpricing as one of the most important factors when deciding share repurchases (Brav et al., 
2005, Mitchell et al., 2001) and there is evidence that they time the SRP announcements to 
exploit the potential undervaluation (Ikenberry et al., 1995). Separately from the signaling 
framework, Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) view SRPs as options to exchange the market value 
of the shares with their true value, thereby expanding the company’s investment opportunity set. 
Two basic questions that arise are, first, to what extend the managers possess the ability 
to detect any mispricing opportunities during the implementation of an SRP, and, second, 
whether investors perceive the firms’ repurchases as a signal of undervaluation. Furthermore, 
there is a variety of value-adding choices such as market timing, price support and size of 
repurchases, which would be useful to presumably better-informed management (Cook et al., 
2004). Market timing implies that the firm repurchases at a low price compared to the subsequent 
non-repurchase period (Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007). Price support implies that the firm 
repurchases in a contrarian fashion, thus, the stock price during the repurchases is lower than it 
is on prior periods but not significantly different from subsequent periods (Ginglinger and 
                                                             
1 Alternative - and not necessarily mutually exclusive - motives also cited in the literature for repurchases in general 
are: dividend substitution (Grullon and Michaely, 2002), capital structure adjustment (Bonaimé et al., 2014, Lie, 
2002), option exercise in stock option plans (Bens et al., 2003, Fenn and Liang, 2001, Kahle, 2002), agency costs 
of free cash-flow (Grullon and Michaely, 2004), and takeover defense (Denis, 1990). 
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Hamon, 2007). In the same spirit of adding value to the firm’s shareholders, the size of 
repurchases enhances the strength of repurchases as signals to outside investors (Zhang, 2005).   
The questions posed above are difficult to examine in the USA capital markets (Stephens 
and Weisbach, 1998), particularly due to the lack of timely data on actual share repurchases. 
Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) report that stock buybacks in the USA do not have a standard 
structure, they lack typical procedures and are characterized by a relatively low degree of 
transparency, as they are not made public at the time they are conducted. Indeed, up to 2004, 
various USA studies were based either on estimates of the actual repurchases made (Stephens 
and Weisbach, 1998) or on questionnaires that some companies answered voluntarily (Cook et 
al., 2004). Beginning in 2004, companies were required to disclose the number of shares acquired 
each month and the average acquisition price per share. This information is released later, in the 
financial statements, and although such retroactive notifications increase transparency in the long 
run, investors are not informed immediately about the firm’s most recent actions (Simkovik, 
2009).  
Some markets other than those of the USA, such as Australia, Canada and Hong Kong, 
have a more transparent repurchase framework in which companies are required to disclose the 
share repurchases made within a day. Studies that use daily data find, among other things, that 
the companies buy their own shares when the share prices are on a declining path, that the 
managers are capable to time the markets, and that firms acquire their shares at a price lower 
than the average investor does (Brockman and Chung, 2001, Zhang, 2005, McNally et al., 2006, 
Akyol and Foo, 2013). 
The present study uses a unique database with hand-collected data from the Greek stock 
market, covering the period from August 2005 to December 2010. During this period, companies 
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were required to disclose publicly their daily transactions on share repurchases immediately. The 
Greek legal framework provides the required transaction transparency and its capital market a 
rich data volume (7,619 announcements of share repurchases are observed during the period 
under examination). This enables us to draw reliable conclusions about the repurchase activity 
on the part of firms and about the reaction on the part of investors, especially in a period of 
initially rising and eventually declining Greek equity market. Hence, our study contributes 
further evidence to the non-USA literature on actual daily share repurchases which is rather thin, 
consisting of a few notable papers on foreign markets such as Brockman and Chung (2001) and 
Zhang (2005) for Hong Kong, McNally et al. (2006) for Canada, Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) 
for France, and Akyol and Foo (2013) for Australia.  
Regarding our findings, a general result is that different firms proceed to actual 
repurchases for different reasons and at different times, which is in line with the result of Dittmar 
(2000) for SRP announcements. Using the full set of announcements, we find that companies 
engage in buybacks when the stock price exhibits a declining trend, and that the short-term 
market reaction is not statistically significant, a result that is consistent with the price support 
hypothesis (Cook et al., 2004, Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007, Akyol and Foo, 2013, Zhang, 2005). 
However, when we focus on firm characteristics, we find that smaller firms and firms with a 
higher book-to-market ratio repurchase shares without having observed significant fluctuations 
in the period preceding the buybacks, while the short-term investor reaction is positive and 
statistically significant. In contrast, larger firms and firms with a lower book-to-market ratio 
repurchase shares after periods in which the stock price is in a declining course, and, after the 
share acquisitions, a price stabilization takes place. This result agrees with Zhang (2005).  
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Regarding repurchase characteristics, when there is a small number of announcements in 
a period of three months before the actual repurchase announcement, the CARs behave in 
accordance with the market timing hypothesis. When there is a short interval between 
announcements or when the percentage of shares bought back is low, the results confirm the 
price support hypothesis, and when the percentage of share bought back is high, the findings 
support the signaling undervaluation hypothesis.  
The stated reason for authorizing an SRP is related to the stock behavior before and after 
the actual repurchase as follows: Firms which state the price support as a reason for approving 
an SRP when it’s stock is considered underpriced, receive a positive reaction by the market when 
they proceed with the actual implementation of the SRP. Firms that avoid mentioning a specific 
reason for approving SRPs seem to use the stock buybacks as a means of stopping the declining 
trend of their share price. The stated-reason results are in the same spirit as in the paper of Akyol 
and Foo (2013), albeit not directly comparable due methodological differences.  
In contrast to the literature of actual share buybacks, such as Zhang (2005) and Akyol 
and Foo (2013), we find a strong long-term abnormal return for firms that conduct repurchases. 
In addition, the long-run return of these firms is positively related to the frequency of actual 
repurchases and negatively related to book-to-market ratios.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical framework and the 
hypotheses to be tested are presented in the next section. Section 3 describes the data and the 
methodology. The empirical results are shown in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
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2. Theoretical background and development of hypotheses  
2.1. The market timing hypothesis  
Market timing, or managerial timing ability, is a term that refers to the issuance of new shares 
by a company when its stock price is at high levels and the acquisition of own shares when the 
stock price is at low levels. The purpose of these company actions is to exploit the current stock 
price fluctuations for the benefit of the long-term investors. An obvious precondition is that the 
market should not be characterized by strong form efficiency (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
 A fundamental question related to stock buybacks is to what extend the executives use 
their private information to proceed with stock repurchases (Barclay and Smith, 1988). 
Brockman and Chung (2001) use daily data from the Hong Kong stock market and find that 
executives possess a market timing ability which depends on the market conditions and the 
special characteristics of the firm.  
 Using monthly data from Japan, Ishikawa and Takahashi (2011) find that firms acquire 
their own shares if their stock price has followed a declining trend during the previous month, 
and that the stock returns of firms actually repurchasing shares exceeds the market return during 
the ensuing months. The results support the notion that company executives do possess the 
private information and/or the ability to detect when the capital market has been driven by 
mispricing.  
 The market timing hypothesis implies that the market price of the stock will be lower 
during the dates of conducting share repurchases in comparison to the subsequent days 
(Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007). The recent study by De Cesari et al. (2012) for the USA finds 
that indeed the companies seem to possess the ability to time the market and succeed in acquiring 
their own shares at a relatively low price. In addition, they find that during the month before the 
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share acquisitions, the stock price follows a declining trend and a negative abnormal return is 
observed, whereas after the repurchase, a positive abnormal return is observed. The studies of 
Ben-Rephael et al. (2014) and Dittmar and Field (2015) also find results consistent with the 
market timing hypothesis.  
H1: Negative abnormal returns are observed before the stock repurchases in the open market and 
positive abnormal returns are observed after the stock repurchases.  
 
2.2. The price support hypothesis  
According to the price support hypothesis, share repurchases are conducted by a company to 
stem a declining trend in the stock price. The main difference with the market timing hypothesis 
is that, a stabilization of stock prices is expected after the share repurchase, whereas in the case 
of the market timing hypothesis, a positive abnormal return is expected.   
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) study the French market and find that companies proceed 
to stock buybacks following periods of declining stock prices, but they do not observe a 
significant price increase after the repurchase. The results are consistent with the price support 
hypothesis. Similar results are found by Cook et al. (2004) for the shares that are traded at the 
New York Stock Exchange.  
H2: Negative abnormal returns are observed in the period before a stock repurchase occurs and 
no abnormal returns are observed during the period after the repurchase.  
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2.3. The signaling undervaluation hypothesis 
The signaling undervaluation hypothesis suggests that managers are using share repurchases to 
signal “their disagreement with how the market is pricing existing public information” (Grullon 
and Ikenberry, 2000).  
The signaling undervaluation hypothesis distinguishes from the market timing hypothesis 
in that, for the period before the repurchase, the stock price is not necessarily on a declining path 
(the firm does not trade against the market).  
In the studies of Zhang (2005) and Akyol and Foo (2013), even though the undervaluation 
hypothesis is not explicitly addressed, the results are in accordance with this hypothesis. Zhang 
(2005) finds that the market reaction is positive for small and firms with high book-to-market 
ratio, which are more likely to be underpriced. Akyol and Foo (2013) report that for firms that 
state undervaluation as the motive for initiating a share repurchase program, the price reaction is 
positive when those firms proceed to the actual buybacks. The abnormal return for the ten-day 
period before the repurchase is not statistically significant for the undervaluation motive firms. 
H3: Firms repurchase even though the stock price is not following a specific trend and the market 
reacts positively to the repurchase announcements. 
 
2.4. Company characteristics and repurchase behavior 
Several studies find that companies with different characteristics exhibit different behavior 
regarding share repurchase activities and the market reaction is also different.  
Ikenberry et al. (1995) examine announcements of SRPs (irrespective of whether the 
shares were eventually bought back) and find that, in the short-run, the market reaction is more 
favorable to SRP announcements by companies of smaller size. Cook et al. (2004) use voluntarily 
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disclosed daily data, to find that the larger companies proceed to buybacks after periods in which 
the stock price exhibits a downward trend, whereas for the smaller companies no such result is 
observed. Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) argue that frequent repurchases are driven by 
different motives than infrequent buybacks. 
H4: Companies with different characteristics repurchase their own shares under different 
conditions.  
H5: The market reaction will be different, depending on the characteristics of the companies that 
conduct repurchases and the firms’ repurchase behavior.  
 
2.5. Stated reasons for approving stock repurchase programs 
Otchere and Ross (2002) examine a sample of announcements of SRPs for which the stated 
reason for their approval is share undervaluation. These announcements are treated as a positive 
signal by the investors, and the market reacts favorably for the companies that approve SRPs. 
Such reaction is smaller, although positive for rival companies in the same industry, a fact that 
is consistent with the undervaluation hypothesis. 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) find that at the announcement of SRP approval, the market 
reaction is stronger for firms that state undervaluation as the motive for the approval. Akyol and 
Foo (2013) use daily data from Australia and conclude that for companies which announce as a 
reason for initiating an SRP the fact that the stock is underpriced, the investors reaction is positive 
and stronger compared to the companies that announce a different reason for SRP approval. This 
observation holds both for the announcement date of the SRPs and for the dates of the actual 
repurchases. In addition, companies which mention their stock underpricing as a reason for 
approving repurchases eventually buy back fewer shares in relation to companies which state a 
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different reason for SRP approval, while daily repurchases do not seem to occur as a response to 
the stock price trend.  
H6: The stated reason for approving SRPs affects the market reaction at the time of actual share 
repurchases.  
 
2.6. Long-term performance of repurchasing firms 
To examine whether managers successfully exploit stock undervaluation, Ikenberry et al. (1995, 
2000) find that, after announcing SRP authorizations, firms exhibit strong abnormal long-term 
returns, and that this result is more pronounced in firms with higher book-to-market ratio. 
Regarding actual daily repurchases, Akyol and Foo (2013) and Zhang (2005) do not find 
significant long-term abnormal returns for repurchasing firms compared to a matching sample 
of non-repurchasing firms, although Zhang (2005) finds that firms with high book-to-market 
ratio perform better in the long term.    
H7: Repurchasing firms perform better in the long-term than non-repurchasing firms.  
 
3. Disclosure requirements and share repurchase data 
In Greece, an open market SRP must be authorized by the shareholders’ General Meeting. At the 
date of the authorization, the General Meeting defines the maximum number of shares that can 
be purchased, the duration of the SRP and the maximum and minimum price that can be paid. Α 
firm may repurchase up to 10% of the outstanding shares, and certain conditions for trading are 
imposed: At the date of the actual buyback, the repurchase price cannot be higher than the price 
of the last trade or the highest current bid. The company cannot repurchase more than 25% of 
the average daily volume of the shares. The average daily volume figure is based either on the 
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daily volume traded in the month preceding the month of public disclosure of that program, or 
the daily volume traded in the 20 trading days preceding the date of purchase. In cases of 
extremely low liquidity, a firm may repurchase up to 50% of the average daily volume, provided 
that both the stock market authority and the investors are informed in advance, as per European 
Regulation No. 2273/2003.  
From 2007, the maximum duration of the programs changed from twelve to twenty-four 
months. The key information about the repurchase programs that is available to the investors in 
the program announcement includes: the date of the general meeting, the maximum number of 
shares to be repurchased, the duration of the program, and the reason for initiating a repurchase 
program, as stated by the company at the date of the SRP authorization (Drousia et al., 2017). 
Until 2005, companies disclosed their repurchase activity over irregular intervals 
spanning from a few months to a whole year. Starting from 2005, when the Directive 2003/6/EU 
was implemented with the Greek Law 3340/2005, the daily repurchase activity of the firms had 
to be posted on the Daily Official List of the Athens Stock Exchange immediately. The key 
available information about the companies’ daily repurchase activity includes the date of the 
actual repurchase, the date of the announcement of the repurchase, the number of repurchased 
shares and the average share price paid. 
Capitalizing on this transparency of the Greek stock market, we construct a unique, hand-
collected dataset including public announcements of companies whose stocks trade on the 
Athens Stock Exchange. The data concerning the repurchase programs and the daily open market 
repurchase activity are hand-collected from the Daily Official List of the Athens Stock Exchange. 
The rest of the data such as stock price, book-to-market ratio and firm size (market value of 
equity) are obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream and Thomson Reuters WorldScope. 
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Table 1 reports the share repurchase activity in Greece from August 2005 to December 
2010. We obtain 7,619 announcements of actual share repurchases, made by 74 firms under 120 
program authorizations. The repurchase dates are 9,664. A factor that differentiates the present 
paper from other studies about actual share repurchases is that the number of the announcements 
and the number of repurchase days do not coincide (Panel A). 
To include an announcement in the study, we require that the number of shares that are 
bought and the average price are reported daily. Several announcements are excluded because: 
i) the company had preferred shares as well as common shares at the date of the SRP 
authorization; ii) they contained buybacks for two to seven days but did not report the number 
of shares or the average price for every day separately, and iii) they were made later (not 
immediately) and is considered very likely that investors had already been informed by another 
source, such as the Internet or a newspaper. Other reasons for excluding announcements are 
repetition of the purchase date and incomplete information. To eliminate extreme observations, 
announcements that contained buybacks for more than seven trading days or are made after a 
reverse split (which changed significantly the number and the price of the company’s traded 
shares) are not included in the study. Panel B of Table 1 reports in detail the number of 
announcements that are excluded. The final dataset includes 7,463 announcements of actual 
share repurchases, made by 69 firms under 109 program authorizations (Panel C). 
The aim of this study is to examine the price performance surrounding the 
announcements of actual share repurchases as well as long-term. It is obvious that the number of 
announcements is quite large for the study period. In Panel D, we observe that most firms (53%) 
made more than fifty announcements. The percentage of firms that announced more than a 
hundred daily transactions is 33%. Throughout the period under consideration two firms made 
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only one announcement, while one firm made 558 announcements. To avoid undue weighting 
of firms and clustering problems we follow the approach of Zhang (2005), that is, when a firm 
makes multiple repurchase announcements within the month, only the first announcement is 
included in the final sample.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the 826 announcements of the final 
sample. Quartile rankings are determined relative to all firms that are listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE) on the day of the actual share buyback announcement. Small firms and firms 
with higher book-to-market ratio (B/M) have made less repurchase announcements, while larger 
firms report more repurchase days during the study period. In 2008, the number of repurchase 
announcements almost tripled from the previous year, as the stock exchange index dropped to 
lower levels following the onset of the global financial crisis. Panel B of Table 2 reports the 
number of trading days per announcement. The announcements that report more than one 
repurchase day are about 23.5% of the dataset. We proceed with the estimation of the short-term 
market reaction surrounding the actual share repurchase announcements. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
4.1. Short-term share price performance  
We use the standard event study methodology to estimate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
around the announcements of actual daily share repurchases. The market model is used as the 
benchmark model, with an estimation period ranging from 200 to 21 days before the 
announcement (−200, −21) and an event window that starts 20 trading days before the date of 
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the announcement and ends 20 days after the announcement (−20, +20). The market returns are 
based on the General Index of the Athens Stock Exchange. Day “0” is the day of the 
announcement at the Daily Official List of the Athens Stock Exchange. To determine statistical 
significance, we use the Patell Z-test.  
Table 3 reports the average cumulative abnormal return around the announcements of 
actual share repurchases. The windows (−20, −1) and (−10, −1) are used to examine whether 
firms tend to repurchase when the stock price underperforms the market. Repurchasing when the 
stock price follows a downward trend is consistent with both the market timing and the price 
support hypothesis. The window (0, +1) aims to capture the effect of the initial announcement. 
The windows (+2, +10) and (+2, +20) are used to examine the short-term market reaction 
immediately after the announcement and a month (approximately 20 trading days) after the 
announcement.  
The results for the full sample (Panel A of Table 3) suggest that companies buy shares 
after intervals where the stock price shows a downward trend. The immediate response is not 
statistically significant. In the period immediately after the announcement, i.e., event window 
(+2, +10), investors show a slightly positive reaction that gradually disappears. Between (+2, 
+20), the reaction is not statistically different from zero. This is corroborated by Figure 1, which 
shows the cumulative average abnormal return for the 41-day period surrounding the 
announcement date (−20, +20). The results are consistent with the price support hypothesis (H2) 
rather than the market timing hypothesis (H1), and agree with Ginglinger and Hamon (2007).  
The next section examines whether and how some company and repurchase characteristic 
affect the company repurchase decision and the market reaction. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
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(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
4.2.  Share price performance related to company and repurchase characteristics 
Various studies suggest that company characteristics affect the company repurchase activity as 
well as the investors’ reaction. Dittmar (2000) argues that different firms proceed to buybacks 
for different reasons. Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000) find that companies with higher book-to-
market ratio report higher long-term abnormal return after the announcement of SRP 
authorizations. Furthermore, the market reacts more favorably to buyback announcements of 
smaller companies. Cook et al. (2004) observe that larger firms repurchase after periods when 
the price of the stock underperforms the market.  
 We proceed with the examination of the company characteristics. In Panel B of Table 3 
the announcements are grouped according to firm size and B/M ratio. The firm size is estimated 
as the market value of equity. Quartile rankings are computed using all listed firms on the day of 
the actual repurchases announcement. 
Overall, the results suggest that smaller firms and firms with higher B/M ratio (whose 
shares are likely to be undervalued) repurchase shares even though the share price has not 
experienced any abnormal change in the period preceding the announcement. Investors short-
term reaction is positive and statistically significant. Larger firms and firms with lower B/M ratio 
repurchase shares after intervals when the shock price follows a declining path. Following the 
share buyback, we observe a stabilization of prices. Thus, the results for smaller firms and firms 
with higher B/M ratio are in accordance with the signaling undervaluation hypothesis (H3). The 
results for the larger firms and firms with lower B/M ratio are consistent with the price support 
hypothesis (H2). The findings are similar to those of Zhang (2005). 
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In Panel C of Table 3 the data are grouped according to repurchase characteristics. 
Following the methodology of Zhang (2005) we used three variables: a) the number of days that 
elapse between the announcement under consideration and the immediately preceding 
announcement within a year period, b) the number of company announcements in the quarter 
preceding the current announcement, c) the percentage of shares acquired over the number of 
outstanding shares. The first two variables estimate the degree of "surprise" of the announcement, 
that is whether it was expected or unexpected by investors. The announcements are divided into 
two categories with cut-off point the median of each distribution. The third variable is an estimate 
of the signal’s strength. In this case the announcements are divided into two equal subsets. 
When the announcements are frequent (either the interval between the announcements is 
less than three days or the number of announcements is greater than the median in the preceding 
quarter) the initial reaction is not statistically significant, which is somehow expected. For the 
cases where the number of days since the previous announcement and the repurchase size are 
small, we observe negative and statistically significant abnormal reaction for the preceding 
period. The CAR(+2,+20) is not statistically significant. The results are in accordance the price 
support hypothesis. For the cases where the number of announcements is small in the quarter 
before the announcement the findings are consistent with the market timing hypothesis. For the 
cases where the repurchase size is high, the results support the signaling undervaluation 
hypothesis. Overall, we conclude that hypotheses H4 and H5 hold. 
 
4.3. Share price performance related to the reason for program authorization 
In Greece companies are required to announce the reason for initiating a SRP at the date of the 
program authorization. The most common reason for authorization, as stated by the companies, 
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is stock undervaluation. For a large percentage of the programs, the reason is not explicitly stated 
(the company just states that the acquisitions will be conducted in accordance to the respective 
applicable laws). Few programs fall into a third category, with various causes of approval, for 
example, the cancellation of shares to reduce its share capital, sell-back to the market, 
distribution to employees or a combination of these reasons.  
Using the categorization mentioned above, we examine the market reaction to 
announcements of actual share repurchases. The evidence in Table 4 indicates that the short-term 
market reaction is greater when the firm-stated reason for authorizing a SRP is to support the 
stock price in case of undervaluation. When the reason is not explicitly stated, the CAR for the 
preceding period is negative and statistically significant, while the short-term CAR(+2, +20) is 
not statistically significant. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms repurchase 
in a contrarian fashion to stem the decline in its stock price. When the reason is very specific but 
other than supporting the stock price, it appears that the information is already incorporated in 
the share price and there is no statistically significant reaction. Therefore, there is evidence that 
hypothesis H6 holds.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
4.4. Factors affecting the market reaction 
Cross-sectional regression analysis is used, to examine whether and to what extent some 
characteristics of companies and announcements affect the market reaction to actual share 
repurchase announcements. Following Zhang (2005), we regress the initial market reaction, 
CAR(0, +1), the immediate short-term reaction, CAR(+2, +10), and a month after the 
announcement, CAR(+2, +20), on firm and repurchase characteristics. 
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 Table 5 reports summary statistics for the variables we use in our regression analysis. 
“Firm size” is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity and “B/M” is the book-to-
market ratio, both measured on the day of the announcement. “CAR(−20, −1)” denotes the 
abnormal return for the month before the announcement. “NDLR” is the number of days since 
last repurchase announcement and estimates the time between the announcement under 
consideration and the previous one, within a year. “NAP3M” is the number of announcements 
during preceding 3 months calculated by the announcements made within the last 90 days before 
the announcement under examination. The variables “NDLR” and “NAP3M” are determined 
based on Zhang's (2005) methodology. “NTDA” is the number of trading days included in the 
announcement and reports the trading days that the firms acquired shares and are disclosed on 
the same day. “Repurchase size” is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to shares 
outstanding. We also include dummy variables for the three different groups of stated reasons 
for SRP authorization: price support in case of undervaluation, not specific reason and stated 
reason other than price support. Since the coefficients of the dummy variables are not statistically 
significant in any case, they are not further reported. Also, to reduce the influence of extreme 
values, the variables are formed by winsorizing at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
(Insert Table 5 here.) 
 Table 6 shows the results of three main regression models with the method of ordinary 
least squares (OLS). We observe that the coefficient of the B/M ratio is positive, a finding that 
supports the signaling undervaluation hypothesis. Also, the investors reaction is negatively 
related to the number of announcements in the previous quarter, a result that is different from 
Zhang (2005). Interestingly, the coefficient of the abnormal performance in the period before the 
announcement is positive and statistically significant only in the period (+2, +10). 
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 (Insert Table 6 here) 
 
4.5. Long term price performance 
We examine long term returns to see if managers can actively take advantage of mispricing 
opportunities. We follow the methodology of Barber and Lyon (1997) and compare one-, two- 
and three-year buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) against a control sample, using monthly data.2 The 
firms in the control sample are selected by first requiring the matching firm to have a market 
value between 70% and 130% of the repurchasing firm in the same calendar year, and then 
selecting the firm with the closest B/M to that of the repurchasing firm.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 7, the repurchasing firms outperform the control firms for 
all periods. The negative return signs are a result of the falling equity market especially after 
2007. The BHARs are 11.57%, 18.1% and 29.18% for the one-, two-, and three-year holding 
periods and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, thereby confirming hypothesis H7. 
This is consistent with the notion that managers have successfully used repurchases to support 
the stock price and add value for their shareholders. Note that the result is different from Akyol 
and Foo (2013) and Zhang (2005) who do not find significant long-term abnormal returns for 
repurchasing firms.   
Further examination of the BHARs by size quantile in Panel B of Table 7, the 
repurchasing firms exhibit statistically significant abnormal returns, especially the smaller ones. 
Furthermore, considering the B/M characteristics of the firms, we observe that the BHARs for 
repurchasing firms are positive and most of them are significant at the 1% level. The firms with 
                                                             
2 Thus, our total data coverage extends to 2013, three years beyond the announcements period. 
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the highest B/M ratios (quartile 1 and 2), seem to perform better than control firms, especially in 
three-year holding horizons, and this result agrees with Zhang (2015).  
Regarding the relationship between announcement reasons and long-term returns, all the 
stated reasons for conducting a repurchase are positively related to BHARs, as shown in Table 
8.  However, when the company’s reason for conducting a repurchase is specified in the 
announcement and it is different from stock undervaluation, the repurchasing firms seem to 
exhibit the strongest long-term abnormal performance.  
The three-year BHAR is regressed against several variables, as shown in Table 9. We 
conclude that the B/M variable is negatively related to the return, as expected. Also, the number 
of repurchases made during the preceding three-month period is positive and statistically 
significant. In other words, frequent repurchasers seem to be characterized by high long-term 
price performance.  
Insert Table 7 here. 
Insert Table 8 here. 
Insert Table 9 here. 
 
4.6. Robustness tests 
We also perform sensitivity tests: (1) using alternative estimation periods (−250, −31) and (−300, 
−41); (2) using alternative short-run announcement period return windows such as (−1, +1) and 
(−2, +2); (3) winsorizing the returns at the 1st and 99th or 5th and 95th percentiles to control for 
outliers; (4) using other parametric and non-parametric test methods such as the standardized 
cross-sectional test of Boehmer et al. (1991), which accounts for event-induced variance, and the 
rank test of Corrado (1989); and (5) using other benchmark models such as the market-adjusted 
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return model, the mean-adjusted return model, and the market model with the Scholes-Williams 
beta estimation method. None of these variations changes our results. 
Akyol and Foo (2013) follow the methodology of Zhang (2005) with a slight variation: 
For the calculation of the variables that assess the degree of "surprise", they impose a further 
restriction that the announcements are made under the same program. We use the same 
modification to re-estimate the abnormal returns. The results are similar. 
During the period under examination, some firms made only one share repurchase 
announcement. Other firms repurchased almost daily while their SRP was in effect. To examine 
if the Mean CAR has been affected by the companies with the largest number of announcements, 
we conduct the following test. We calculate the average cumulative abnormal return for each 
company separately and then carry out significance tests across firms. The results do not change.  
To ensure that our results are robust to the clustering problem, we use alternative 
techniques for estimating standard errors and found similar results. We calculate standard errors 
adapted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation according to Newey and West (1987). Finally, 
we group the residuals in two dimensions, by company and by day, following the two-way 
technique proposed by Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011). The coefficients of the variables 
about the stated reasons for SRP authorizations are not statistically significant in any model.3 
 
5. Conclusions 
The paper contributes further evidence to the literature on actual share repurchases in non-USA 
markets which are characterized by timely disclosure of buyback transactions. That literature is 
                                                             
3 All robustness tests are available from the authors upon request. 
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loosely defined by articles such as: Brockman and Chung (2001); Zhang (2005); McNally et al. 
(2006); Ginglinger and Hamon (2007); and Akyol and Foo (2013).  
Using data from the Greek stock market, we examine when companies choose to 
implement their approved SRPs, and how investors react when they are notified about company 
actions such as actual repurchases. In addition, we investigate how some company characteristics 
(firm size and book-to-market ratio) and some company choices (frequency and size of 
repurchases), as well as the preceding mandatory company announcement stating the reason for 
approving an SRP affect the behavior of companies and investors in the short- and the long-term.  
Our results show that companies whose stock is more likely to be underpriced acquire 
their own shares without a preceding decline in stock prices, and the reaction of investors is 
positive. The results are consistent with the signaling undervaluation hypothesis. The rest of the 
companies acquire shares after periods in which the stock price exhibits a declining trend. After 
the acquisition of the shares, the stock price exhibits signs of stabilization in the short run, a fact 
that is in line with the hypothesis of stock price support. In addition, the company’s earlier stated 
reason for approving SRPs seems to play some role in the market reaction to announcements of 
daily repurchases. Long-term abnormal returns are higher for repurchasing firms compared to 
non-repurchasing controls, and depend positively on the frequency of repurchases and the initial 
stated reason for program authorization.  
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Figure 1 
Mean CAR for the window (−20,+20).  Day “0” on the horizontal axis is the date of the 
announcement of the actual share repurchases 
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Table 1  
Summary statistics of daily share repurchases in Greece from August 2005 to 
December 2010 
Panel A:  Full dataset  
Number of firms 74 
Number of program authorizations 120 
Number of repurchase announcements 7,619 
Number of repurchase days 9,664 
Total number of shares repurchased 276,627,699 
Value of repurchased shares (in euro) 3,172,032,951 
Average repurchase days (per firm) 131 
Average repurchase announcements (per firm) 103 
Panel Β:  Reason for excluding announcements  
Preference shares 87 
The number of shares or the average price is not known for 
every day separately 42 
Late announcements 1 
Repetition of repurchase date 9 
Missing information 2 
The announcement reported more than seven trading days 10 
Reverse split 5 
Panel C:  Dataset after excluding the announcements in Panel B 
Number of firms 69 
Number of program authorizations 109 
Number of repurchase announcements 7,463 
Number of repurchase days 9,065 
Total number of shares repurchased 269,574,548 
Value of repurchased shares (in euro) 1,827,838,405 
Average repurchase days (per firm) 131 
Average repurchase announcements (per firm) 108 
Panel D:  Number of repurchase announcements per firm 
Number of firms with less than 10 repurchase announcements 11 (16%) 
Number of firms with 11-20 repurchase announcements 9 (13%) 
Number of firms with 21-50 repurchase announcements 12 (17%) 
Number of firms with 51-100 repurchase announcements 14 (20%) 
Number of firms with more than 100 repurchase announcements 23 (33%) 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of open market share repurchases from August 2005 to December 2010 
Panel A: Size and B/M quartiles 
Year Repurchase Size quartile  Book-to-market quartile 
 announcement 1(small) 2 3 4(large)  1(high) 2 3 4(low) 
2005 10 0 7 3 0  0 7 3 0 
2006 49 0 21 14 14  5 22 13 9 
2007 86 2 16 33 35  33 12 17 24 
2008 240 19 70 35 116  50 43 77 70 
2009 230 39 46 57 88  39 110 30 51 
2010 211 16 48 61 86  32 63 65 51 
All 826 76 208 203 339  159 257 205 205 
Panel B: Distribution of trading days per announcement 
Trading days per 
announcement 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number of 
announcements  
631  59  37  26  49  21  3  
Percent  76.5 7.1 4.5 3.1 5.9 2.5 0.4 
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Table 3  
Abnormal share price performance surrounding announcements of actual share repurchases 
      Window        
    N (−20,−1)  (−10,−1)  (0,+1)  (+2,+10)  (+2,+20) 
Panel A: Full sample  
CAR  826 −0.95%*** −0.74%*** −0.14% 0.58%** 0.46% 
   (−2.88) (−2.83) (−0.98) (2.05) (0.84) 
Panel B: Announcements grouped by firm characteristics 
1. By size quartile 
CAR 1 (small) 76 2.22% 0.16% −0.17% 2.19%* 3.67%** 
    (1.21) (0.12) (0.06) (1.77) (2.50) 
CAR 2 208 −0.62% −0.22% −0.47%* −0.05% 0.01% 
    (−0.59) (−0.12) (−1.89) (−0.15) (0.15) 
CAR 3 203 −0.98% −0.45% 0.08% 0.77%* 1.10% 
    (−1.33) (−0.71) (0.29) (1.67) (1.17) 
CAR 4 (large) 339 −1.85%*** −1.44%*** −0.06% 0.50% −0.36% 
    (−3.58) (−3.83) (−0.29) (1.12) (−0.90) 
2. By B/M quartile 
CAR 1 (high) 159 1.53% 0.70% 0.56%* 2.15%*** 2.56%** 
    (0.79) (0.77) (1.88) (2.67) (2.21) 
CAR 2 257 −0.28% −0.26% −0.22% 0.48%* 0.95%* 
    (0.04) (−0.42) (−0.64) (1.70) (1.75) 
CAR 3 205 −2.82%***  −1.44%*** −0.22% −0.39% −1.18%* 
    (−3.64)  (−2.66) (−0.56) (−0.87) (−1.78) 
CAR 4 (low) 205 −1.84%*** −1.77%*** −0.50%** 0.47% −0.13% 
      (−2.88) (−3.24) (−2.34) (0.72) (−0.45) 
Panel C: announcements grouped by repurchase characteristics 
1. By number of days since last repurchase announcement 
CAR ≤ 3 422 −1.34%*** −1.10%*** −0.11% 0.97%** 0.70% 
    (−2.97) (−3.21) (−0.46) (2.00) (0.52) 
CAR > 3 404 −0.55% −0.37% −0.17% 0.17% 0.22% 
    (−1.09) (−0.77) (−0.93) (0.89) (0.66) 
2. By number of announcements during the preceding 3 months 
CAR ≤ 13 416 −1.79%*** −1.08%*** −0.15% 1.31%*** 1.38%** 
    (−3.36) (−2.60) (−0.98) (3.70) (2.44) 
CAR > 13 410 −0.10% −0.40% −0.13% −0.16% −0.47% 
    (−0.71) (−1.40) (−0.40) (−0.82) (−1.27) 
3. By repurchase size (%) 
CAR low 413 −1.18%*** −0.80%** −0.24% 0.26% −0.03% 
    (−2.69) (−2.46) (−1.18) (0.60) (−0.65) 
CAR high 413 −0.73% −0.68% −0.03% 0.90%** 0.95%* 
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      (−1.38) (−1.54) (−0.20) (2.30) (1.83) 
The CARs are measured against the market model with the estimation period from 200 to 21 days before the 
announcement. The Patell Z-test for the significance of means is shown in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
31 
 
Table 4 
Mean CAR grouped by the reason for initiating the SRP, as stated in the company announcement. 
  Window 
  (−20,−1) (−10,−1) (0,+1) (+2,+10) (+2,+20) 
1. Stock considered undervalued 
CAR −0.68% 0.27% 0.08% 1.11%* 1.77%** 
  (−0.02) (1.17) (0.29) (1.76) (2.10) 
2. Non-stated reason 
CAR −1.37%*** −1.20%*** −0.19% 0.65%* 0.52% 
  (−3.52) (−4.05) (−0.98) (1.71) (0.63) 
3. Stated reason, other than stock undervaluation 
CAR 0.49% 0.35% −0.09% −0.08% −0.70% 
  (0.15) (0.34) (−0.62) (0.00) (−1.04) 
The CARs are measured against the market model with the estimation period from 200 to 21 days before the 
announcement. The number of announcements is 104, 576 and 146 for the first, second and third category of stated 
reason, respectively. The Patell Z-test for the significance of means is shown in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics 
  
CAR  
(0,+ 1) 
CAR 
(+2,+10) 
CAR 
(+2,+20) Firm Size  B/M 
CAR 
(−20, −1) NDLR NAP3M      NTDA 
Repurchase 
size (%) 
Mean −0.001 0.006 0.005 11.667 1.591 −0.01 11.838 21.505 1.642 0.038 
Median −0.003 0.002 0.002 11.161 1.104 −0.011 3 13 1 0.014 
Std. Dev.  0.037 0.076 0.112 1.93 2.441 0.118 25.996 20.02 1.356 0.069 
Min −0.15 −0.474 −0.652 8.53 0.112 −0.69 0 0 1 0 
Max 0.224 0.488 0.409 16.922 16.915 0.409 247 66 7 0.848 
Obs. 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 
The CARs are measured against the market model with the estimation period from 200 to 21 days before the announcement. “Firm size” is the natural logarithm 
of the market value of equity on the announcement date. “B/M” is the book-to-market ratio measured on the announcement date. “NDLR” is the number of days 
since last repurchase announcement. “NAP3M” is the number of announcements during preceding 3 months. “NTDA” is the number of trading days included 
in the announcement. “Repurchase size” is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to shares outstanding.
33 
 
            Table 6  
            Regression results 
 CAR (0,+1) CAR (+2,+10) CAR (+2,+20) 
Intercept −0.011 0.014 0.068** 
 (−1.24) (0.69) (2.10) 
CAR (−20,−1) −0.022 0.052** 0.048 
 (−1.27) (2.03) (1.15) 
Firm size  0.001 0.000 −0.004 
 (0.99) (−0.05) (−1.85) 
B/M 0.001*** 0.002** 0.001 
 (4.35) (2.10) (0.77) 
NDLR 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (−1.21) (−0.23) (−0.26) 
NAP3M  0.000 −0.001** −0.001** 
 (−0.18) (−2.50) (−2.30) 
NTDA  0.001 −0.002 0.000 
 (0.64) (−0.91) (−0.06) 
Repurchase size  0.004 0.056 0.038 
 (0.22) (1.39) (0.67) 
Obs. 826 826 826 
Number of firms  69 69 69 
R-squared 0.011 0.023 0.023 
The CARs are measured against the market model with the estimation period from 200 
to 21 days before the announcement. “Firm size” is measured by the natural logarithm of 
the market value of equity. “B/M” is the book-to-market ratio. “NDLR” is the number of 
days since last repurchase announcement. “NAP3M” is the number of announcements 
during preceding 3 months. “NTDA” is the number of trading days included in the 
announcement. t-tests are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. “Repurchase size” is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to shares 
outstanding. The symbols ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 7  
Long-term buy-and-hold returns following actual share repurchases up to three years 
    1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
  N Return N Return N Return 
Panel A: Full sample   
Repurchase firms  701 −9.58% 612 −27.82% 519 −22.81% 
Control firms   −21.15%  −45.92%  −51.99% 
Difference   11.57%***  18.10%***  29.18%*** 
t-test   (7.97)  (9.14)  (8.87) 
Panel B: Announcements grouped by firm characteristics       
1. By size quartile 
Repurchase firms 1 (small) 54 −12.83% 36 11.73% 10 49.01% 
Control firms   −27.84%  −37.88%  −70.08% 
Difference   15.01%**  49.61%***  119.09%** 
t-test   (2.14)  (3.41)  (2.75)         
Repurchase firms 2 175 −14.25% 150 −29.99% 125 −29.68% 
Control firms   −17.41%  −47.08%  −43.88% 
Difference   3.16%  17.09%***  14.20%** 
t-test   (1.12)  (4.60)  (2.49)         
Repurchase 
firms 3 173 −7.70% 142 −17.28% 127 10.43% 
Control firms   −28.18%  −44.15%  −55.31% 
Difference   20.48%***  26.87%***  65.74%*** 
t-test   (7.61)  (6.57)  (7.17)         
Repurchase firms 4 (large) 299 −7.36% 284 −36.95% 257 −38.68% 
Control firms   −18.08%  −47.21%  −53.58% 
Difference   10.72%***  10.26%***  14.90%*** 
t-test   (4.99)  (4.14)  (5.10) 
2. By B/M quartile 
Repurchase firms 1 (high) 147 −17.58% 128 −30.73% 95 −28.42% 
Control firms   −27.09%  −44.83%  −59.06% 
Difference   9.51%***  14.10%***  30.64%*** 
t-test   (3.27)  (3.71)  (4.71)         
Repurchase firms 2 226 −9.09% 187 −19.40% 171 1.02% 
Control firms   −25.26%  −46.62%  −50.72% 
Difference   16.17%***  27.22%***  51.74%*** 
t-test   (5.99)  (7.08)  (6.67)         
Repurchase firms 3 151 −11.82% 132 −28.66% 101 −33.06% 
Control firms   −14.53%  −46.88%  −46.81% 
Difference   2.71%  18.22%***  13.75%*** 
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t-test   (0.87)  (4.07)  (2.96)         
Repurchase firms 4 (low) 177 −1.67% 165 −34.42% 152 −39.29% 
Control firms   −16.64%  −45.20%  −52.43% 
Difference   14.97%***  10.78%***  13.14%*** 
t-test     (5.34)   (3.02)   (3.09) 
Long-term returns are measured using the Barber and Lyon (1997) control-firm methodology using monthly data. 
The symbols **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8  
Long-term buy-and-hold returns grouped by the reason for initiating the SRP, as stated in the 
company announcement. 
  1-Year 2-Year  3-Year 
  N Return N Return N Return 
1. Stock considered undervalued 
Repurchase firms 84 −5.78% 70 −16.93% 68 −25.45% 
Control firms  −11.76%  −39.14%  −53.76% 
Difference  5.98%  22.21%***  28.31%*** 
t-test  (1.58)  (3.36)  (3.25) 
2. Non-stated reason             
Repurchase firms 482 −10.05% 411 −30.52% 345 −26.70% 
Control firms  −20.58%  −44.71%  −47.47% 
Difference  10.53%***  14.19%***  20.77%*** 
t-test  (5.89)  (6.15)  (6.47) 
3. Stated reason, other than stock undervaluation  
Repurchase firms 135 −10.28% 131 −25.15% 106 −8.45% 
Control firms  −29.05%  −53.33%  −65.55% 
Difference  18.77%***  28.18%***  57.10%*** 
t-test   (5.91)   (6.33)   (5.42) 
Long-term returns are measured using the Barber and Lyon (1997) control-firm methodology using monthly data. 
The symbol *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 9 
Regression Results 
  1-Year BHARs   2-Year BHARs   3-Year BHARs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Intercept 0.307 0.312 0.354  1.109*** 1.143*** 1.189***  1.716** 1.752** 1.955*** 
 (1.33) (1.35) (1.59)  (2.71) (2.89) (2.97)  (2.52) (2.54) (2.85) 
            
CAR (−20,−1) 0.183 0.185 0.181  0.143 0.161 0.133  0.568** 0.593** 0.549* 
 (1.31) (1.31) (1.28)  (0.78) (0.89) (0.72)  (2.06) (2.12) (1.93) 
            
Firm size  −0.018 −0.018 −0.016  −0.074** −0.074** −0.068**  −0.122** −0.124** −0.116** 
 (−1.07) (−1.08) (−0.96)  (−2.46) (−2.59) (−2.37)  (−2.55) (−2.56) (−2.63) 
            
B/M −0.020 −0.020 −0.023  −0.050** −0.050*** −0.057***  −0.062* −0.061* −0.087** 
 (−1.33) (−1.33) (−1.51)  (−2.49) (−2.65) (−2.69)  (−1.86) (−1.87) (−2.23) 
            
NDLR 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.46)  (0.61) (0.46) (0.65)  (0.06) (−0.02) (0.08) 
            
NAP3M  0.004** 0.004** 0.004**  0.004** 0.005** 0.004**  0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 
 (1.99) (2.01) (2.03)  (2.07) (2.29) (2.11)  (2.13) (2.28) (2.26) 
            
NTDA  −0.016 −0.024 −0.025  −0.036 −0.076** −0.053*  0.007 −0.032 −0.029 
 (−0.97) (−1.22) (−1.34)  (−1.52) (−2.20) (−1.91)  (0.25) (−0.69) (−0.74) 
            
Repurchase size  −0.131 −0.107 −0.185  −0.338 −0.086 −0.404  −1.642 −1.390 −1.786 
 (−0.28) (−0.22) (−0.38)  (−0.39) (−0.09) (−0.44)  (−1.29) (−0.99) (−1.34) 
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Stated reason - 
undervaluation  0.056    0.290*    0.282  
  (0.68)    (1.77)    (1.46)  
            
Stated reason - 
not available   −0.077    −0.158*    −0.317* 
   (−1.30)    (−1.77)    (−1.94) 
                        
Obs. 701 701 701  612 612 612  519 519 519 
Number of firms  65 65 65  60 60 60  53 53 53 
R-squared 0.059 0.061 0.067   0.122 0.147 0.141   0.157 0.169 0.190 
Long-term abnormal returns (BHARs) are measured using the Barber and Lyon (1997) control-firm methodology using monthly data. “Firm size” is measured by 
the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. “B/M” is the book-to-market ratio. “NDLR” is the number of days since last repurchase announcement. 
“NAP3M” is the number of announcements during preceding 3 months. “NTDA” is the number of trading days included in the announcement. “Repurchase size” 
is the percentage of repurchased shares relative to shares outstanding. t-tests are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
